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INTRODUCTION

In January, 1988, the United States Supreme Court affirmed
the Ninth Circuit appellate court's decision in Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana.1 The Supreme Court's decision in Crow capped
* This comment benefited greatly from the comments and suggestions of Professor
Margery H. Brown and Professor Brenda Desmond, and from the resources of the University of Montana School of Law Indian Law Clinic. Any errors or omissions are the author's
alone.
1. Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 469 F. Supp. 154 (D. Mont. 1979), rev'd and
remanded, 650 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1981), opinion amended 665 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 916 (1982) [hereinafter Crow f], 657 F. Supp. 573 (D. Mont. 1985),
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almost a decade of intense litigation between Montana and the
Crow Tribe. At stake was the right to tax Crow mineral resources,
a right worth millions of dollars annually to the prevailing party.2
In holding that Montana could not tax Crow mineral resources, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals significantly extended recent Supreme Court rulings on state taxation of Indian tribes. The Crow
case is therefore an important development in federal Indian law.
The case is also an important development in Montana's historical
struggle to defend its coal severance taxes. In exercising a fundamental power of self-government, the power to tax, both the Tribe
and Montana remain subject to Congress' plenary power. By impinging on the Crow's sovereign right to benefit from their own
tribal resources, Montana may have weakened its own asserted
right to tax resource extraction statewide. This comment explores
the Crow case as it evolved over ten years, explaining the significance of the case to both Indian and Montana law.
II.

ORIGINS OF THE CASE

A. History'
In 1851 the United States and the Crow Tribe entered into a
treaty delineating reserved land of thirty-eight million acres and
other reserved rights which the federal government would hold in
trust for the Crow Tribe's beneficial use. 5 A second treaty in 18686
reduced tribal reserved lands to eight million acres lying entirely
rev'd, 819 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'd mem., 108 S. Ct. 685 (1988) [hereinafter Crow II].
2. In the seven years between 1975 and 1982, almost 62 million dollars from coal severance and gross proceeds taxes accumulated on coal mined from the area in dispute. Crow
11, 819 F.2d at 897. As of September 19, 1988, the United States District Court for the
District of Montana held over 29 million dollars in Crow tribal coal severance tax funds in
its registry. See Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, No. CV 78-110-BLG slip op. at 1 (D.
Mont. Sept. 19, 1988).
3. This comment will, by and large, present only those "facts" which the district court
and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals considered germane to the disposition of this case.
Note, however, that history and the courts often differ.
4. Treaty of Fort Laramie, 11 Stat. 749 (1851).
5. Crow 11, 657 F. Supp. at 575.
6. Treaty of Fort Laramie, 15 Stat. 649 (1868). In United States v. Montana, 604 F.2d
1162 (9th Cir. 1979), the court detailed the reservation's origins:
The Crow Indian Reservation is the remnant of a much larger tract of land recognized as Crow lands by the United States in the Treaty of Fort Laramie of 1851..
. In 1868, this original reservation was diminished from one of 38,531,174 acres to
one of approximately 8,000,000 acres by the Second Treaty of Fort Laramie ....
Subsequent Congressional Acts have reduced the size of the reservation even further to its present acreage-of approximately 2,282,764 acres.
Id. at 1164 (citations omitted). The court further explained the reservation property division as follows:
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within what, twenty-one years later, would become the state of
Montana.' In 1904, responding to homesteading pressure, Congress
passed an act compelling the Crow Tribe to cede over a million
acres of its reserved lands to the United States. 8 The federal government later opened up this million-plus acre "ceded strip" to
homesteading. 9 However, the United States retained most of the
mineral rights underlying the surface of the ceded strip. 10 Homesteading progressed, and non-Indian homesteaders purchased"
surface patents to most of the area in the ceded strip. 2 The ceded
strip spans Treasure, Big Horn, and Yellowstone counties. Now
populated mainly by non-Indians, the strip's economy continues to
revolve around agriculture."3
The 1904 cession of the Crow lands constituted only a small
part of a national policy designed to lead to the eventual abolition

Type of
Ownership

Acreage

Percentage of
Ownership to
Total Acreage

Allotted
Tribal
(Surveyed)
Tribal
(Unsurveyed)
Government Owned
Yellowtail Dam
State Lands
Fee Lands

1,187,592.34
379,740.64

52.02%
16.64%

15,850.85

.69%

1,400.50
6,695.64
44,804.82
646,679.12

.07%
29%[sic,.29%]
1.96%
28.33%

TOTAL:

2,282,764.00

100.00%

Id. at 1164 n.3.
7. Crow 11, 657 F. Supp. at 575.
8. Id. (citing Crow Cession Act of April 27, 1904, Pub. L. No. 183, 33 Stat. 352 (1904)).
Though the terms of the cession supposedly resulted from field negotiations between the
federal government and the Crow Tribe, the Crow had little bargaining power, and the result of the "negotiations" was one-sided at best. See F. PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER 295-96
(1986). In remarks made to the House Committee on Indian Affairs just three days prior to
the Crow Cession Act, Indian Commissioner Jones said about obtaining cessions on the
Rosebud Reservation:
If you depend upon the consent of the Indians as to the disposition of the land
where they have fee to the land, you will have difficulty in getting it, and I think
the decision in the Lone Wolf case, that Congress can do as it sees fit with the
property of the Indians will enable you to dispose of that land without the consent
of the Indians.
Id. at 296.
9. Crow 11, 657 F. Supp. at 576.
10. Id. See text accompanying notes 22 and 72, infra.
11. The lands were made available to homesteaders at $4.00 per acre. Crow Cession
Act of April 27, 1904, Pub. L. No. 183, § 5, 33 Stat. 352, 360 (1904).
12. Crow II, 657 F. Supp. at 575.
13. Id.
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of all Indian reservations. 1' Congress furthered this assimilationist
policy through diminishment of reserved lands and through allotment in fee of reserved lands to individual Indians. 5 In 1934, Congress recognized the devastating effect that allotment and sale of
ceded reservation lands had had on Indian tribes."6 Expressing renewed commitment to tribal self-government and the reservation
trust system, Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act
(IRA).17 The IRA's major purpose was to halt the erosion of tribal
14. The General Allotment Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887), commonly
known as the Dawes Act, provided that the executive branch could allot 160 acres of reservation land to each Indian head of family residing on the reservation, and make allotments
of 80 acres to individuals if the allotments were in the best interest of the tribe. These
allotment acreages were to be doubled if the land was suitable for grazing. After 25 years of
holding each allotment in trust, the federal government would convey fee simple title to the
individual Indian or the Indian head of family.
The Act further provided that reservation lands not allotted to Indian families be designated as "surplus." With the consent of the tribe, any such "surplus" could then be sold,
and most buyers were non-Indian homesteaders. The result of the Dawes Act was a reduction of Indian reserved lands held in trust from 138 million acres in 1887 to 48 million in
1934.
Proponents of the allotment scheme included federal legislators convinced that eventual abolition of reservations and assimilation of all Indians were in the best interest of
Indians. Also backing the Dawes Act were legislators representing homesteaders and land
speculators eager to wrest reserved land holdings from the tribes. For an authoritative discussion of the policy behind the allotment era, see F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW 20-24,78-82,206-33 (1942); W. CANBY, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 19-23
(1988).
Continued pressure from homesteaders and land speculators during this period resulted
in additional Congressional acts, such as the 1904 act diminishing the Crow Reservation,
wherein tribes "ceded" vast portions of then-reserved land holdings for sale by the federal
government to non-Indians. COHEN, supra.
15. The comments of Indian Commissioner Leupp, made in his first report to Congress in 1905, illustrate the guiding philosophy behind allotment:
[Ilt is our duty to set [the Indian] upon his feet and sever forever the ties which
bind him either to his tribe, in the communal sense, or to the Government. This
principle must become operative in respect to both land and money ....
Thanks
to the late Senator Henry L. Dawes of Massachusetts, we have for eighteen years
been individualizing the Indian as an owner of real estate by breaking up, one at a
time, the reservations set apart for whole tribes and establishing each Indian as a
separate landholder on his own account.
COHEN, supra note 14 at 24, quoting the remarks of Commissioner Leupp, ANN. REP.
COMM'R. INDIAN AFF.

16.

at 3-4 (1905).

In 1928, Congress received the report, The Problem of Indian Administration, IN-

STITUTE FOR GOVERNMENT RESEARCH

(1928), commonly known as the "Meriam Report." The

report spurred wholesale rethinking of federal Indian policy by tracing the actual effects of
allotment and assimilationist policies. Most Indian allottees, unable to pay taxes or make a
go of farming on the small allotments, had sold their allotments or leased them long-term to
non-Indians. Allotment policy had therefore not only abolished reserved tribal holdings, but
had also resulted in cutting off individual Indians from a sustaining land base. See PRUCHA,
supra note 8 at 278-79, 304, 312-16; CANBY, supra note 14 at 23-25; F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW,

17.

128-32 (1982 ed.).

25 U.S.C. § 461 (1934). Congress responded to the Meriam Report in 1934 with the
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lands caused by allotment policies. The IRA also provided tribes
with several means for reorganization by establishing procedures
tribes could use to participate more directly in the determination
of their economic and governmental futures. 18 To help achieve
these purposes, the IRA restored to various tribes many of the
mineral rights and lands which those tribes had previously ceded
to the federal government.' The IRA allowed tribes to accept or
decline restoration of land and mineral rights made available
under its provisions.2 0 The Crow Tribe did not accept the IRA, and
therefore rejected restoration of its rights in the ceded strip.21
As a result of the IRA, however, the federal government suspended sale of surface rights on the ceded strip and continued to
hold the subsurface mineral rights in trust for the use and benefit
of the Crow Tribe. 2 To this end, under the terms of the IRA, the
federal government leased subsurface mineral rights in the ceded
strip for the benefit of the Crow Tribe.28 In 1938, Congress passed
the Indian Mineral Leasing Act (IMLA),' reaffirming the intent
behind the IRA of 1934 in respect to mineral leasing. The IMLA
restored to the tribes the possibility of controlling mineral leases,
subjecting that control only to the approval of the Secretary of the
Indian Reorganization Act, halting allotment and sale of "surplus" Indian lands and extending the trust period indefinitely. The IRA reorganized "surplus" but unsold, unhomesteaded tribal lands and returned them to reservation status. The IRA provided that the
government would thereafter hold those lands in trust for the benefit of the tribes. The IRA
also authorized the Secretary of the Interior to purchase additional lands to augment the
vastly diminished reservations.
Some of the tribes, such as the Crow, rejected restoration of ceded lands under the IRA
because of their fear of federal government domination. See note 20 infra; CANBY, supra
note 14 at 24. Meanwhile, the federal government continued to hold these ceded lands (to
which ceding tribes were entitled under the IRA) in trust for the benefit of those tribes.
Despite successes of the IRA, the era of allotment and cession in federal Indian policy
resulted in the jurisdictional nightmare of "checkerboarded" reservations wherein non-Indians hold fee simple title to sections throughout the reservations. CANBY, supra note 14 at 99102. The policy of allotment and assimilation also resulted in the complex jurisdiction of the
ceded strip in the Crow cases.
18. Crow I, 650 F.2d at 1112. The United States Supreme Court has noted that Congress' purpose in passing the IRA was in part to "rehabilitate the Indian's economic life and
to give him a chance to develop the initiative destroyed by a century of oppression and
paternalism." Mescalaro Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 152 (1972) (quoting H.R. REP.
No. 1804, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1934)).
19. Crow 11, 657 F. Supp. at 576.
20. Id.
21. Id. For a discussion of the many reasons why particular tribes elected not to come
under the terms of the IRA, see 2 F. PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER 959-65 (1984).
22. Crow I, 469 F. Supp. at 156.
23. For a more complete discussion of the various Indian mineral leasing acts and
their effect on the tribes, see Blackfeet Tribe v. Montana, 729 F.2d 1192 (9th Cir. 1984).
24. The Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a-396g (1976) (cited in
Crow I, 650 F.2d at 1107).
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Interior.2 5 Among the IMLA's stated purposes was to assure that
2' 6

tribes receive "the greatest return from their property.
In 1958, Congress enacted legislation requiring tribes that had
refused to accept the terms of the IRA to retake lands and rights
which, under the terms of the IRA, the federal government had
held in trust since 1934.1 Under the provisions of the Indian Restoration Act of 1958, full beneficial title to the mineral rights underlying the ceded strip passed from the United States back to the
Crow Tribe. 28 In 1958, then, the Tribe secured the same kind of
title to the ceded strip mineral rights that the Tribe held for its
other reserved lands. Since 1958, the federal government has held
the mineral rights for the ceded strip in trust specifically for the
Crow Tribe's use and benefit, as it holds all other Crow tribal
lands. Because of the changes wrought by the 1958 Indian Restoration Act, Crow mineral rights on the ceded strip became subject to
regulation under the 1938 IMLA. 29 In effect, the Crow Tribe's reserved rights to the subsurface minerals of the ceded strip, while
temporarily interrupted, date back to the treaty establishing all of
the Crow's reserved land rights.30
25. Id. at 1112.
26. Crow II, 819 F.2d at 898 (quoting S. REP. No. 2, H.R. RE:P. No. 1872, 75th Cong., 3d
Sess. 2 (1938)).
27. The Indian Restoration Act of May 19, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-420, 72 Stat. 121
(cited in Crow II, 819 F.2d at 897).
28. Crow II, 819 F.2d at 897.
29. Id. at 898.
30. Crow I, 650 F.2d at 1107. In its initial opinion dismissing the Tribe's claim, the
district court founded its reasoning in part on the concept that the incidence of the tax fell
not on the Tribe, but on "the production and income of non-Indian coal mine operators."
Crow I, 469 F.Supp. at 165. The district court relied on Montana statutes and turn-of-thecentury case law directed at the taxation of non-Indian grazing leaseholders to reach this
conclusion. Id. (citing Truscott v. Hurlbut Land and Cattle Co., 73 F. 60 (9th Cir. 1896)).
The court found that because it was Westmoreland Resources that actually severed the coal
and paid taxes to Montana, it was "inconceivable" that Montana's taxes infringed on Indian
rights. Id. Had the Crow elected to come under the provisions of the 1934 IRA, the Crow
district court might have had more certainty about the status of the mineral rights underlying the ceded strip. The IRA provides that:
[Any lands or rights acquired pursuant to any provision of the Act shall be taken
in the name of the United States in trust for the Indian tribe or individual Indian
for which the land is acquired, and such lands or rights shall be exempt from state
and local taxation.
25 U.S.C. § 465 (emphasis added). Of course, the question of whether Montana's severance
tax is a levy on the coal alone or on the right to the coal as well is more complex. In Mescalero, for example, the United States Supreme Court held that the tax New Mexico wished
to levy on the Tribe's off-reservation ski resort lay not on the leased land or right, but on
the economic activity that the land generated. "[A]bsent clear statutory guidance, courts
ordinarily will not imply tax exemptions and will not exempt off-reservation income from
tax simply because the land from which it is derived, or its other source, is itself exempt
from taxes." Mescalero, 411 U.S. at 156 (emphasis added). However, where reservation re-
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The southeastern region of Montana contains vast reserves of
bituminous coal, now commercially prized because of its cleanburning characteristics. 1 The Crow Reservation and the ceded
strip overlie a portion of these coal reserves.32 In 1972, the Crow
Tribe leased the rights to mine coal under thirty-one thousand
acres of the ceded strip to Westmoreland Resources Corporation."
In 1975, the Montana legislature imposed two separate taxes
on all coal production within the state. The first enactment, the
Montana Coal Severance Tax, imposed a tax on mined coal on a
per-ton basis, with the rate of taxation varying from three to thirty
percent of the coal's market value.3 4 In addition to the Coal Severance Tax, the legislature imposed a gross proceeds tax on "each
person engaged in coal mining."' ' Montana bases the gross proceeds tax on coal producers' gross yields from coal sales and links
the tax to individual Montana counties' property taxes. Therefore,
the gross proceeds tax that each producer pays varies depending
on the mine's location. 6
In 1975, Montana imposed both the Coal Severance and the
gross proceeds tax on Westmoreland Corporation's Crow-lease
mining operations in the ceded strip. 7 From the first imposition of
the taxes in 1975 until 1981, Westmoreland paid to the state 53.8
million dollars in severance taxes and 8.1 million dollars in gross
proceeds taxes as a result of its Crow-lease operations in the ceded
strip.38
In 1976, the Crow Tribe enacted its own coal severance tax for
sources generate an economic activity on the reservation, the Court is more chary of such
distinctions. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 220 (1987).
31. T. Gill, Coal Development Potential in Eastern Montana 1-14 (1972) (report to the
Montana Environmental Council, available in the University of Montana Mansfield Library,
Missoula, Montana).
32. Crow I, 650 F.2d at 1107. In 1974, it was estimated that over eight billion tons of
strippable coal underlie the Crow and Northern Cheyenne Reservations. Over 60% of the
lands on the Crow Reservation are estimated to contain coal deposits in commercially
favorable formations. Native American Natural Resources Development Federation of the
Northern Great Plains, Declaration of Indian Rights to the Natural Resources in the Northern Great Plains States 13-15 (Report to the Northern Great Plains Resources Program,
June, 1974) (available at the University of Montana Mansfield Library, Missoula, Montana).
33. Crow I, 650 F.2d at 1107. See also BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF THE
INTERIOR, I FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT CROW CEDED AREA COAL LEASE TRACTS II AND

III WESTMORELAND RESOURCES 1-11 (Dec. 1976).
34. Crow I, 650 F.2d at 1107 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 15-35-101 to -111 (1979),
amended by MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-35-103 (1987); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 15-23-701 to -704
(1979), amended by MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-23-701 (1987)).

35.
36.
37.
38.

MONT. CODE ANN.
MONT. CODE ANN.

§ 15-23-701 (1987).
§§ 15-23-701 to -704

(1987).

Crow II, 819 F.2d at 897.

Id.
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coal mined from the subsurface within Crow Reservation boundaries.3 9 The Crow impose a twenty-five percent severance tax on
Crow coal, a rate which in effect exactly equals Montana's coal
taxes.4 0 The Department of the Interior approved the Crow's severance tax as it applies to coal mined within reservation boundaries.4 1 Because the Tribe has not yet allowed the development of
any major coal sites within the boundaries of the post-1904 reservation, however, the tribal severance tax has yet to produce tribal
revenues. In 1982, the Crow Tribe enacted a severance tax to ap39. Crow 11, 657 F. Supp. at 586.
40. Id. at 587. The issue of whether a tribe may impose its own tax on non-Indian
activity on the reservation has been long settled. In Washington v. Confederated Tribes of
the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980), the Supreme Court said:
The power to tax transactions occurring on trust lands and significantly involving
a tribe or its members is a fundamental attribute of sovereignty which the tribes
retain unless divested of it by federal law or necessary implication of their dependent status ... [Flederal law to date has not worked a divestiture of Indian taxing
power.
Id. at 152.
41. Crow 11, 819 F.2d at 897. In Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe, 471 U.S. 195
(1985), the Supreme Court held that the Navajo Tribe which, like the Crow, elected not to
come under the provisions of the IRA, did not, under the terms of the 1938 IMLA, have to
submit tax laws to be imposed on mineral lessees to the Secretary of the Interior for approval. Id. at 201. Unlike the Crow, however, the Navajo had no provision in the tribal
constitution that mandated the Secretary's approval. Discussing the method by which many
tribes arrived at a tribal constitution following the passage of the IRA, the Court said:
Many tribal constitutions written under the IRA in the 1930's called for Secretarial approval of tax laws affecting non-Indians ....
But there were exceptions to
this practice ....
Thus the most that can be said about this period of constitution
writing is that the Bureau of Indian Affairs, in assisting the drafting of tribal constitutions, had a policy of including provisions for Secretarial approval; but that
policy was not mandated by Congress.
Id. at 198. The Secretary of the Interior rejected the Crow's initial attempt to levy a severance tax on coal mined on the ceded strip in 1982. However, the basis for the rejection arose
not from any dispute over the Tribe's power to tax, but rather because the Secretary had
not yet recognized the on-reservation status of the coal on the ceded strip. Crow 11, 819 F.2d
at 897.
42. As of 1972, the Tribe had leased 61,123.93 acres of unallotted reservation lands to
Westmoreland and to Shell Oil. In addition, the Tribe had issued prospecting permits for
another 178,978.39 acres to Gulf Oil, Peabody Coal Co., and AMAX, Inc. See Decision of the
Secretary of the Interior Relating to Crow Tribe v. Kleppe, 4 I.L.R. 1-2 (Jan. 20. 1977). See

also K.R.

TOOLE, THE RAPE OF THE GREAT PLAINS

44 (1976).

The Tribe became concerned about the possible major impact of coal mining on the
Tribe's cultural and environmental resources, and cancelled most of the leases. Id. at 44-45.
See also Cady v. Morton, 527 F.2d 786 (9th Cir.1975) (suit was brought against the Secretary of the Interior by environmentalists concerned about environmental impacts of strip
mining on the reservation, and about Bureau of Indian Affairs failure to follow statutory
lease requirements. The Ninth Circuit held that the coal leases constituted "major federal
action" and required the preparation of environmental impact statements). See also, Crow
Tribe Community Action Program, A Sample Survey of Attitudes About Coal Development
- Crow Tribe (1973) (available at the University of Montana Mansfield Library, Missoula,
Montana). The survey reported that 94.3% of those tribal members surveyed thought the
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ply to coal mined through leases of Crow subsurface mineral rights
in the ceded strip." The Department of the Interior refused to approve this tax, however, because it believed the Constitution of the
Crow Tribe precluded its imposition."' The Crow promptly
amended their constitution to allow the imposition of severance
taxes on coal mined through leased mineral rights in the ceded
strip." In the meantime, the Crow negotiated a new lease contract
with Westmoreland for the company to pay this "tax" contractually, instead of under tribal law, in addition to its royalty fees."
Since 1982, Westmoreland has paid over $20 million into a federal
district court escrow fund in lieu of payment of either Montana or
Crow coal taxes.4 7
Tribe should institute a moratorium on coal development until more was known about it.
Id. at 2.
In 1974, the Tribe petitioned the Secretary of the Interior to cancel the 1972 Westmoreland leases, then amounting to approximately 31,000 acres. The Tribe alleged severe mismanagement and failure of the Bureau of Indian Affairs to properly uphold its trust responsibility to the Tribe. As a result of this petition, the Tribe was able to renegotiate the terms
of its Westmoreland leases (raising royalty payments from 17.5 cents per ton to approximately 40 cents per ton) and also to ensure closer scrutiny from the Secretary. See UNITED
STATES BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, CROW CEDED
AREA COAL LEASE TRACTS II AND III WESTMORELAND RESOURCES 5-7 (1976).
43. CROW TRia. CoAL TAXATION CODE tit. I §§ 1 to 13 (1982).
44. Crow II, 819 F.2d at 897. For discussion of obtaining Department of the Interior
approval, see note 41 supra. It is notable that neither the district court nor the court of
appeals appropriately cited to either the constitution of the Crow Tribe, or the Crow Tribal
ordinances which provided for taxation of Crow coal. Attorneys, as a matter of good practice, and the courts, as a matter of comity, should cite tribal codes and constitutions properly, as they would the laws of any other sovereign.
45. Crow II, 657 F. Supp. at 586. The Crow Tribal Council amended the Crow Tribal
Constitution to take jurisdiction over the coal on the ceded strip on July 10, 1982. CRow
TaiE. CONST. art. VI § X (1982).
46. Crow II, 657 F. Supp. at 587.
47. Crow II, 819 F.2d at 897. The fund continues to accumulate substantial interest
while the district court deliberates its ultimate disposition. See supra note 2. Westmoreland
Resources and the Crow Tribe continued to dispute the validity of this contractual tax after
the final disposition in Crow II. In July, 1988, the district court dismissed Westmoreland's
contention that the Tribe had failed to enact a valid tax and ordered the funds in escrow
released. Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, No. CV 78-110-BLG slip op. at 2, 3, 8 (July 11,
1988).
The court has not yet released the funds, however, due first to a dispute between the
United States and the Tribe as to the proper recipient of the funds, the United States arguing that the Tribal Coal Taxation Code calls for payment of the taxes into the United States
Treasury in trust for the Tribe, and the Tribe arguing that the terms of its amended Westmoreland leases override the Tribal Coal Taxation Code and provide for direct payment to
the Tribe. See id., slip op. at 1 (Sept. 7, 1988).
The court subsequently ordered payment of the funds to the Treasury, and then withdrew the order for further consideration. Id., slip op. at 2 (Sept. 19, 1988), slip op. at 1, 2
(Oct. 7, 1988). The issue is complicated by allegations of fraud and mismanagement that
some tribal members have levied against the current Tribal Chairman. See id., Amicus Curiae Brief (Sept. 12, 1988). One year after the Supreme Court's affirmance then, the funds
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In 1978, the Crow Tribe brought suit against the state of Montana to challenge the imposition of state coal taxes on Crow leaseholders and Crow coal in the ceded strip. The Crow suit also
sought a declaratory judgment as to the validity of state coal taxes
imposed on coal produced within the boundaries of the Crow Reservation should Montana ever attempt to impose them.4 8 The
United States District Court for Montana dismissed the suit for
failure to state a claim.4 9 The Tribe appealed.
In 1981, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court and remanded the action for trial.5 0 In 1985, after trial,
the district court upheld Montana's tax on coal mined in the ceded
strip and declined to decide whether the state could tax future coal
mining within the Crow Reservation's boundaries.5 1 The Tribe appealed again. In June of 1987, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
reviewed the case de novo and reversed the district court.52 The
state then appealed the Ninth Circuit's decision to the U.S. Supreme Court. On January 12, 1988, the Supreme Court affirmed
the Ninth Circuit appellate court without opinion. 53

III.

DISCUSSION

The final decision in the Crow taxation cases turns on the adjudication of five distinct but interrelated issues. First, the federal
courts had to determine whether the Crow's mineral rights in the
ceded strip were or were not part of the Crow Reservation. Second,
and always an issue in state taxation of Indian activities, the courts
analyzed whether federal law preempted"' the imposition of Montana taxes on coal mined from the ceded strip. Next, the courts
have yet to be distributed in full.
48. Crow 1, 469 F. Supp. 154.
49. Id.
50. Crow 1, 650 F.2d at 1107.
51. Crow 11, 657 F. Supp. 573.
52. Crow 11, 819 F.2d at 896.
53. Crow II, aff'd mem., 108 S.Ct. 685 (1988).
54. Note that preemption analysis in federal Indian law veers substantially from the
analysis used in other areas of federal law. As the Supreme Court stated in White Mountain
Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980):
The unique historical origins of tribal sovereignty make it generally unhelpful to
apply to federal enactments regulating Indian tribes those standards of pre-emption that have emerged in other areas of the law. Tribal reservations are not
States, and the differences in the form and nature of their sovereignty make it
treacherous to import to one notions of pre-emption that are properly applied to
the other.
Id. at 143.
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examined whether Montana furthered a legitimate state interest in
imposing coal taxes on Crow ceded strip coal. Even if legitimate,
however, the state's interest yet had to overcome possible infringement of Crow tribal self-government and economic determination.
Finally, the appellate court found justiciable the issue of whether
Montana could tax coal mined within the boundaries of the Crow
Reservation. The differing views of the district and appellate
courts on each of these five issues compelled their radically different holdings.
A.

The Reservation Status of Ceded Strip Mineral Rights

The district court based its decision to uphold the Montana
tax to a large extent on the status of the ceded strip. While acknowledging that Congress' 1958 Act restored the mineral rights
underlying the strip to the Tribe's full beneficial ownership, the
district court concluded that "[tihe undisposed-of ceded minerals
underlying entered land were not added to and made a part of the
Crow Reservation by the 1958 Act."6
The district court reasoned that while the 1958 Act restored
the mineral rights to the Crow, the Act could not have restored the
rights to reservation status because the Crow Tribe exercises no
sovereign powers over the surface of the ceded strip. 6 Instead, the
state of Montana and the three Montana counties exercise all jurisdictional rights and powers over the populace and surface of the
57
ceded strip area.

Indeed, because the Tribe no longer holds title to the lands
overlying the disputed coal, and because less than one percent of
the strip's population is Indian, the Tribe has no traditional basis
for jurisdiction over any of the surface of the ceded strip.58 In finding that the Crow exercise no jurisdiction over the surface of the
ceded strip, the district court relegated the Crow's interest in the
ceded strip coal to simple "ownership," comparable to any other
9
Montana coal lessor's royalty interest.
This characterization of the Crow's interest in ceded strip coal
55. Crow 11, 657 F. Supp. at 590.
56. Id. The district court relied heavily on the reasoning in Little Light v. Crist, 649
F.2d 682 (9th Cir. 1981), wherein the court of appeals lauded and published the district
court's earlier opinion in Hawkins v. Crist, No. CV-76-99-BLG (D. Mont. 1978). In Little
Light, quoting Hawkins, the court of appeals concluded that the Crow Cession Act of 1904
had effectively diminished the Crow Reservation and that the Crow Tribe had relinquished
criminal jurisdiction over the ceded strip. Little Light, 649 F.2d at 690.
57. Crow 11, 657 F. Supp. at 579, 592.
58. Id. at 579-82.
59. Id. at 594. See also note 30, supra.
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informed the district court's selection from the myriad of precedents available in Indian taxation case-law in deciding the Crow
case. The district court chose to invoke case law dealing with offreservation Indian economic activity in reaching its conclusion that
the state taxes were validly imposed on the Crow coal in the ceded
strip.
In particular, the district court relied heavily on Mescalero
Apache Tribe v. Jones.6 0 In Mescalero, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that the Mescalero Apache Tribe's operation of a ski resort off
the reservation on national forest lands was subject to state taxation." Unlike the circumstances of the Crow case, however, neither
the IRA nor the Indian Restoration Act of 1958 restored the federal land at issue in Mescalero to the Mescalero Tribe. The Crow
district court nonetheless found the Mescalero rationale
compelling. 2
The Supreme Court had distinguished Mescalero from a line
of earlier state taxation cases wherein the Court rejected state taxation of on-reservation tribal economic activities.6 Noting that the
Mescalero conducted their activity off the reservation, the Supreme Court said, "[A]bsent express federal law to the contrary,
Indians going beyond reservation boundaries have generally been
held subject to non-discriminatory state law otherwise applicable
to all citizens of the state. ' 64 The Supreme Court thus confirmed
that state taxes, like other state laws, applied to off-reservation Indian activities.
The Crow district court's reasoning paralleled the rationale of
Mescalero.a5 Montana's coal taxes are clearly non-discriminatory,
applying equally to Indian and non-Indian coal holdings. The district court concluded that because the Crow held only a royalty
interest in the ceded strip coal, Westmoreland Corporation's min60. 411 U.S. 145 (1973). The IRA of 1934 empowered the Mescalero Tribe to enter
into leases and to act as a corporate entity. The Tribe operated a ski resort on leased federal
land adjacent to the reservation. However, unlike the Crow mineral rights at issue in Crow I
and Crow II, the Mescalero leasehold had been severed from the federal/tribal trust relationship, and so the resort's non-reservation status, while at the crux of Mescalero, was not
itself an object of litigation. Mescalero, 411 U.S. at 146. It is notable, however, that while
the Court rejected any sweeping immunity from state taxation in these circumstances, it
still construed the provisions of the IRA to preclude state taxation of "land or rights" acquired by a tribe pursuant to the purposes of the IRA. Id. at 155. In keeping with this
concept, then, the Court allowed the state's corporate income tax to stand, but rejected any
state taxation of the personalty attached to the leased land (lifts, lodges etc.). Id. at 158.
61. 411 U.S. at 158.
62. Crow II, 657 F. Supp. at 591.
63. Mescalero, 411 U.S. at 148.
64. Id. at 148-49.
65. Crow II, 657 F. Supp. at 591 (quoting Mescalero, 411 U.S. at 148-49).
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ing of Crow coal was, like the Mescalero ski resort, an off-reservation activity."0 The district court reasoned, then, that absent federal law to the contrary, the Crow coal in the ceded strip was
subject to Montana's taxes.6 7
In reversing the district court's conclusion about the reservation status of the ceded strip coal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals referred to its earlier opinion remanding the case for trial.6 8
In that case, Crow I, the court of appeals had unequivocally declared that "the underlying minerals are a 'component of the reservation land itself.' "69 The court of appeals had based this conclusion on the 1958 Indian Restoration Act, which "restored to
reservation status all lands returned to tribal ownership under the
Act."7 Apparently the Crow I court equated returned mineral
rights with returned "lands" in the Indian Restoration Act. Thus,
by extension, the Crow I court of appeals had decided that when
the Indian Restoration Act returned ceded strip mineral rights to
Crow tribal ownership, the Act also restored those rights to the
reservation.
By tracing the history of the ceded strip mineral rights, the
Crow If appeals court sought to correct the district court's misconception of the effect of surface jurisdiction on the status of the
mineral interests which lie below the surface. 71 The court of appeals in Crow H did not fully address each of the district court's
findings and conclusions regarding the status of the ceded strip
mineral rights, but instead emphasized the critical distinction between above-surface state and county rights and below-surface tribal rights. The appellate decisions make clear that despite the
Crow's compelled cession of the strip in 1904, the Crow Tribe
never lost sovereign interest in the subsurface minerals.7 2
The terms of the 1904 Cession Act dictated that the federal
66. Crow II, 657 F. Supp. at 591. Illustrating the crucial importance of the ceded
strip's on or off reservation status, Mescalero, which the Crow district court found so compelling, states:
[I]n the special area of state taxation, absent cession of jurisdiction or other federal statutes permitting it, there has been no satisfactory authority for taxing Indian reservation lands or Indian income from activities carried on within the
boundaries of the reservation, and McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n ...
lays to rest any doubt in this respect by holding that such taxation is not permissible absent congressional consent.
Mescalero, 411 U.S. at 148.
67. Crow 11, 657 F. Supp. at 591.
68. Crow H, 819 F.2d at 898.
69. Id. (quoting Crow 1, 650 F.2d at 1117) (emphasis added).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 898 n.1.
72. Id. at 898; Crow I, 650 F.2d at 1117.
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government would hold all ceded lands and rights in trust for the
Crow until such time as the federal government actually sold the
lands or rights and paid the Tribe for the sale.7s Transfers in fee
made pursuant to the 1904 Cession Act not only transferred land
title to non-Indians, but also replaced tribal jurisdiction with state
jurisdiction over such lands. 74 As a result, and as the district court
observed, Montana and three counties now exercise full jurisdiction over the surface of the ceded strip, and the Crow Tribe retains
75
no jurisdictional rights to the surface.

Between the enactment of the 1904 Cession Act and the 1934
IRA, however, the federal government did not sell the underlying
mineral rights. 76 Because the Crow declined to come under the
terms of the 1934 IRA, the federal government retained these unsold subsurface mineral rights in trust for the Crow for twenty-four
years until the passage of the Indian Restoration Act. 77 When Congress passed the Indian Restoration Act of 1958, it required the
Crow to accept the lands and mineral rights declined in 1934.78 At
no time, then, did the federal government ever transfer title to the
mineral rights to non-Indians or transfer sovereign jurisdiction
over the mineral rights from the Tribe to the state of Montana.79
Instead, the federal government continuously held the ceded
strip mineral rights in beneficial trust for the Tribe. Similarly, the
federal government holds most Crow reservation lands in beneficial
trust for either individual Indians or the Tribe.80 The only remaining issue concerning the status of the mineral rights in the ceded
strip was how the federal government defined Crow subsurface
mineral rights. Were the mineral rights part and parcel of the
73. Crow H, 819 F.2d at 896-97. See also CANBY, supra note 14 at 19-22.
74. Crow H, 819 F.2d at 896, 900.
75. Crow H, 657 F. Supp. at 576; see Little Light, 649 F.2d 682.
76. Crow H, 819 F.2d at 897.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Crow H, 819 F.2d at 898 (citing the Indian Restoration Act of May 19, 1958, 7
Pub. L. No. 85-420, § 2, 72 Stat. 121 (1958)).
80. The Crow Tribe holds its reservation lands subject to the 1851 Treaty of Fort
Laramie, 11 Stat. 749 (1851), modified by the 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie, 15 Stat. 649
(1868). The treaties set the Crow Reservation apart for the use and occupation of the Tribe.
Id., 1868 Treaty at 650. When a treaty creates a reservation, the United States holds Indian
title in fee subject to the tribe's sole right to occupy the land and enjoy its beneficial use.
See D. GETCHES AND C. WILKINSON, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 161-94 (2d ed. 1986). United States
Supreme Court Chief Justice John Marshall first developed this distinction between fee title
and a right of occupancy in three seminal opinions which remain central to an understanding of federal Indian law. See Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 580 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.)
1, 48 (1831).
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Tribe's other reserved rights in their reservation lands, or were the
mineral rights somehow separate from these other reserved rights?
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals turned to the explicit language
of the 1958 Indian Restoration Act to answer this issue. The Act
states, "Title to the lands restored to tribal ownership by this Act
shall be held by the United States in trust for the respective tribe
or tribes, and such lands are hereby added to and made part of
the existing reservations for such tribe or tribes."8 1 According to
these explicit terms, Congress must have restored the Crow's rights
to the minerals in the strip, the Court of Appeals concluded, as "a
component of the reservation land itself. '8 Just as with the Crow's
rights to reservation lands, federal law reserved mineral rights to
the Crow and mandated that the federal government hold the mineral rights in beneficial trust for the Tribe. Just as the Tribe retained sovereign jurisdiction over the surface of its reserved lands,
the Tribe retained sovereign jurisdiction to tax the subsurface of
the ceded strip.83 The ceded strip mineral rights are, therefore,
part and parcel of the Crow reservation, and the law governing offreservation tribal activity is irrelevant.
B.

Preemption Analysis

Having found that the Crow mineral rights underlying the
ceded strip are a component of the reservation, the Crow appellate
court reviewed the district court's preemption analysis. The district court, in concluding that the Crow mineral rights underlying
the strip were not a component of the reservation, placed its decision within the ambit of Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones,", and
hence within the Supreme Court's off-reservation preemption analysis. Mescalero clearly stated that off-reservation tribal economic
activity presents courts with "different considerations" than onreservation economic activity.86 State taxes will generally be appli81. Crow 11, 819 F.2d at 898 (quoting the Indian Restoration Act of 1958, 7 Pub. L.
No. 85-420, § 2, 72 Stat. 121 (1958)(emphasis added)).
82. Crow I, 650 F.2d at 1117; Crow II, 819 F.2d at 898 (quoting Crow 1, 650 F.2d at
1117).
83. Crow II, 819 F.2d at 902; cf. Crow 1, 657 F. Supp. at 591-92 (Tribe has no jurisdiction to tax on the ceded strip).
84. Crow 11, 657 F. Supp. at 591 (citing Mescalero, 411 U.S. at 148-49).
85. Mescalero, 411 U.S. at 148. The Court noted that in respect to the on or off reservation analysis:
Generalizations on this subject have become particularly treacherous. The conceptual clarity of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall's view in Worcester v. Georgia has given
way to more individualized treatment of particular treaties and specific federal
statutes, including statehood enabling legislation, as they, taken together, affect
the respective rights of States, Indians, and the Federal Government.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1989

15

Montana
Law Review,
Vol.REVIEW
50 [1989], Iss. 1, Art. 7
MONTANA
LAW

[Vol. 50

cable to off-reservation tribal economic activity "[a]bsent express
federal law to the contrary."" The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
however, concluded that Mescalero did not apply to the Crow
facts, stating, "[tihe [district] court erred in these findings and in
the conclusions of law."8' 7 First, Mescalero addressed taxation of
off-reservation tribal activities. The appellate court had concluded,
however, that Westmoreland had leased mineral rights which were
part of the reservation. Second, the off-reservation land in Mescalero was federal forest land and was not held in trust for the use
of the Apache Tribe.88 In Crow, however, the federal government
had at all times held Crow mineral rights in trust for the Tribe.
Whether Westmoreland's mining of Crow coal was an on or
off-reservation activity became a critical distinction for the district
and appellate courts' different preemption analyses. Both courts
turned to White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker"9 for the
unique federal preemption standards the Supreme Court has developed for federal Indian law.90 In Bracker, the Court invalidated
a motor vehicle gross receipts tax Arizona had imposed on nonIndian contract loggers operating on reservation land.9 1 In holding
that federal law preempted state taxation in Bracker, the Supreme
Court emphasized reservation boundaries as the basis of its decision.93 By crossing reservation boundaries, imposition of the state
tax in Bracker impermissibly conflicted with federal law.9 3
The Crow district court relied heavily on this geographical
component of the Bracker analysis. Citing Bracker, the district
court reasoned:
[T]here is a significant geographical component to tribal sovereignty, a component which remains highly relevant to the preId. (citations omitted).
86. Id.
87. Crow 11, 819 F.2d at 898.
88. Mescalero, 411 U.S. at 146-47.
89. 448 U.S. 136.
90. Id. at 151-52.
91. Id. at 138. Had Arizona attempted to tax on-reservation activities involving only
Indians, the case would probably have fallen under the rules stated in McClanahan v.Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax
Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959); wherein state intrusion
onto the reservation is preempted by federal law (Warren), precluded by principles of selfgovernment (Williams), and viewed against the "backdrop of tribal sovereignty" (McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 172). Because the activity subjected to taxation in Bracker was conducted
on the reservation by non-Indians, the Bracker Court balanced the state's interest in imposing the tax against the Tribe's interest in self-government and the federal government's
interest in the Tribe as expressed by Congress. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 151-53.
92. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 151.
93. Id. at 153.
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emption inquiry; though the reservation boundary is not absolute,
it remains an important factor to weigh in determining whether
state authority has exceeded the permissible limits. 94

Because the district court had found that Crow ceded-strip mineral rights were off the reservation, the court concluded that the
state tax was valid unless federal legislation "expressly" barred its
imposition.95
The Crow II appeals court, on the other hand, rejected any
requirement for express federal preemption because it had already
declared Crow ceded-strip minerals a "component" of the reservation."6 The appeals court therefore applied the preemption standard the Supreme Court had elucidated in Bracker for on-reservation activities, stating that: "No express congressional statement of
preemptive intent is required; it is enough that the state law conflicts with the purpose or operation of a federal statute, regulation,
or policy. '97 Thus, under the preemption standard developed by
the Supreme Court, the appeals court investigated not express federal preemption, but a possible conflict between Montana's coal
severance tax and federal policies and purposes.9 8 This unique preemption analysis, applying only to federal Indian law, 99 required
94. Crow 1I, 657 F. Supp. at 592 (quoting Bracker, 448 U.S. at 151).
95. Id. at 591.
96.

Crow H, 819 F.2d at 898.

97. Id. (quoting Crow I, 650 F.2d at 1109). The Supreme Court in Bracker, holding
that federal law preempted Arizona's tax, stated:
In a variety of ways, the assessment of state taxes would obstruct federal
policies .... At the most general level, the taxes would threaten the overriding
federal objective of guaranteeing Indians that they will "receive ...the benefit of
whatever profit [the forest] is capable of yielding ...." Underlying the federal
regulatory program rests a policy of assuring that the profits derived from timber
sales will inure to the benefit of the Tribe.... That objective is part of the general
federal policy of encouraging tribes "to revitalize their self-government" and to
assume control over their "business and economic affairs."
Bracker, 448 U.S. at 148-49 (quoting Mescalaro, 411 U.S. at 151) (citations omitted).
98. Crow H, 819 F.2d at 898.
99. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 145. While federal regulation in Bracker did "occupy the
field," the Supreme Court nonetheless used standards unique to Indian law in holding that
federal law preempted Arizona's taxes:
In such cases we have examined the language of the relevant federal treaties and
statutes in terms of both the broad policies that underlie them and the notions of
sovereignty that have developed from historical traditions of tribal independence.
This inquiry is not dependent on mechanical or absolute conceptions of state or
tribal sovereignty, but has called for a particularized inquiry into the nature of the
state, federal, and tribal interests at stake, an inquiry designed to determine
whether ...

the exercise of state authority would violate federal law.

Id. at 144-45; see note 90, supra, for the leading cases developing standards of federal preemption in Indian taxation. It is notable that Montana, which had defended its coal severance tax with such success in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981),
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the court's "particularized inquiry" 10 0 into federal policy and
intent.1 0 1
The Crow appeals court identified the Indian Mineral Leasing
Act of 1938 as a possible source for federal policies or purposes
conflicting with Montana's coal taxes. 10 2 The purpose of that Act,
the Crow appeals court said, was to "revitalize tribal governments"
and to "promote tribal economic development."' 1 13 To help accomplish these goals, Congress intended the Act to maximize tribal
revenue from mineral leases.104 The appeals court thus concluded
that if Montana's coal taxes interfered with the Tribe's ability to
maximize its coal's economic benefit, federal policies would preagain attempted to utilize concepts of federal preemption in Crow I. The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, however, declined to accept Montana's argument, explaining by implication the difference between federal/state preemption issues and principles of preemption as
developed in Indian law:
In that case, [Commonwealth Edison] in the context of a challenge to the Montana coal severance tax as a burden on interstate commerce, the Court upheld the
tax against the challenge that it is not fairly related to the services provided by
the state. The Court stated that wide latitude is afforded the states under the Due
Process Clause in imposing taxes upon particular activities ....
Completely different considerations are implicated in the case before us. Our task is to determine
the limits of state power to tax Indian tribes, Indian-related activities and Indian
trust property. Different congressional acts are at issue.... We do not find Commonwealth Edison to control this case as suggested by appellees.
Crow 1, 665 F.2d at 1391. In essence then, the "wide latitude" that courts will afford states
when only state/federal preemption issues are present narrows dramatically when "Indianrelated activities" enter the field. The preemption interest of the federal government is then
analyzed from the much broader perspective of congressional intent relative to the welfare
of the affected Indians, and to the maintenance of a cohesive federal Indian policy. Thus,
the states often find the tables reversed in issues of Indian taxation, Congress' intentions
receiving "wide latitude," and the states' interests receiving a stricter scrutiny.
100. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 145.
101. In Ramah Navajo School Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832 (1982), the
Supreme Court rejected the Solicitor General's proposed presumption against state taxation
where "on-reservation activities involving a resident tribe" were at stake. Id. at 845. The
Court rejected this presumption because, though such a standard would simplify litigation,
the current standards for Indian preemption analysis "allow for more flexible consideration
of the federal, state, and tribal interests at issue." Id. at 846. Quoting Bracker, the Court
said "federal statutes and regulations relating to tribes and tribal activities must be 'construed generously in order to comport with . . . traditional notions of [tribal] sovereignty
and with the federal policy of encouraging tribal independence.'" Id. (quoting Bracker, 448
U.S. at 144). The Court expressed "disappointment that the courts below apparently gave
short shrift to this principle and to our precedents in this area," and demanded compliance
from lower courts in the future. Id.
102. Crow H, 819 F.2d at 898.
103. Id.
104. Id. See Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, where the Court noted that "the legislative
history [of the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938] suggests that Congress intended ... to
ensure that Indians receive 'the greatest return from their property.'" Id. at 767 n. 5 (quoting S. REP. No. 2; H.R. REP. No. 1872, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 1 (1938)).
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empt the taxes.105
Because of recent developments in the law, the effect of the
state taxes on Crow coal revenues was not the only factor the court
of appeals considered in its preemption analysis. Until the late
1970s, the Supreme Court maintained strong barriers to taxation
of on-reservation activities.1 06 Generally, in the absence of Congressional authorization to the contrary, federal law preempted
state taxation on reservations."0 7 However, a recent line of Supreme Court cases10 8 has expanded Indian federal preemption
analysis to include in certain instances a balancing of state interest
in taxation against a tribal and federal interest in immunity from
state taxation. Thus, where a state demonstrates a strong interest
in asserting its taxing authority over the reservation, its tax may
survive federal preemption.10 9
In Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation,"' for example, the Court held that the state's "legitimate
interest" in taxing sales of cigarettes to non-tribal members on the
reservation predominated over the Tribes' interest in economic development."' The Tribes had sought to bolster their economy
through the imposition of their own tax on cigarette sales to members and non-members.1 2 Because the Colville Tribes did not
themselves produce the cigarettes they sold," 3 the Court said, the
Tribes were merely marketing a state tax exemption to non-members. 1' Thus the Court permitted Washington to impose its tax on
5
non-members of the Tribes.'
State regulations, however, have yet to survive the Colville
balancing test when a tribe generates the economic activity from
its own reservation resources." 6 Thus, in California v. Cabazon
Band of Mission Indians,"7 federal policy preempted state regulation of bingo games because the Band itself operated the games on
105. Crow I, 650 F.2d at 1113; Crow II, 819 F.2d at 898.
106. See supra note 91 for the leading cases.
107. Id.
108. Colville, 447 U.S. 134; Cabazon, 480 U.S. 202; see Fredericks, State Regulation in
Indian Country: The Supreme Court's Marketing Exemptions Concept, a Judicial Sword
Through the Heart of Tribal Self-Determination,this issue.
109. Crow II, 819 F.2d at 896.
110. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
111. Id. at 156-57.
112. Colville, 447 U.S. at 154.
113. Id. at 155.
114. Colville, 447 U.S. at 155.
115. Id. at 159.
116. See Bracker, 448 U.S. 136; Ramah Navaho School Bd., 458 U.S. 832; Cabazon,
480 U.S. 202.
117. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1989

19

Montana
Law Review,
50 [1989], Iss. 1, Art. 7
MONTANA
LAWVol.REVIEW

[Vol. 50

the reservation. 18 The Supreme Court reasserted in Cabazon that
where a tribe or band itself generates the economic activity, "the
federal tradition of Indian immunity from state taxation is very
strong and . . . the state interest in taxation is correspondingly
weak." 1 9 In light of Colville and Cabazon, the Crow court of appeals could uphold Montana's taxation of Crow coal only if the
state's interest in taxation was very strong and the Tribe's claim to
tax immunity correspondingly weak. Relying on its investigation of
the congressional intent behind the 1938 Mineral Leasing Act, the
Crow appeals court characterized the Crow interest at stake as that
of tribal economic development based on reservation resources. '
C.

Tribal Interest in Economic Development

The district court in Crow found, after trial, that imposing
Montana's taxes on Westmoreland's mining of Crow coal in the
ceded strip did not interfere with Crow economic interests.' 2 ' In its
first opinion, the district court had noted that the state taxed only
Westmoreland, which in turn passed the tax on to consumers.' 2 2
Thus, the court reasoned, the state tax never reached the Crow
Tribe.'2 3 In addition, the district court had held that because the
state could not attach Crow lands or mineral rights in the event of
a Westmoreland default in tax payments, the state tax simply
could not affect the Crow Tribe.'2 4 Most importantly, after trial,
the district court found that Montana's coal taxes neither depressed Crow coal royalties nor reduced the Crow share of the coal
market.' 5 While the coal taxes might be a "factor" in the negotiation of Crow coal leases, other factors "overshadowed" the effect of
the taxes.'28 The district court pointed out that national and even
worldwide trends in energy production and demand had depressed
coal pricing and marketing.12 7 Additionally, Montana's remoteness
from coal markets and the high cost of transportation exacerbated
those poor market trends.' 2 8 Finally, the district court criticized
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 215 n.17.
Id.
Crow H, 819 F.2d at 898.
Crow H, 657 F. Supp. at 595.
Crow I, 469 F. Supp. at 159.
Id. at 160.
Id. at 165.
Crow H, 657 F. Supp. at 592.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 588.
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the Tribe's own coal marketing strategies.12 9 If anything adversely
affected the Crow's ability to maximize coal revenues, the district
court concluded, it was these other factors, and not the state's coal
taxes."'I
In reviewing the lower court's decision de novo, the Crow appeals court rejected both the district court's findings of fact and its
conclusions of law.1'3 Not only could Montana's severance taxes
adversely affect Crow coal revenue, the appeals court decided, but
they had in fact done so.1 32 As a first step in reaching this decision,
the court of appeals noted that in enacting the coal taxes, the
Montana legislature intended to appropriate a fixed percentage of
coal resource benefits for the state. '3 3 Montana's tax statutes revealed the legislature's conclusion that coal "is in sufficient demand that at least one-third of the price it commands at the mine
may go to the economic rents of royalties and production taxes."1 34
Clearly the legislature had analyzed the amount of economic rents
coal production could carry with the intent of appropriating a portion of those rents for the benefit of the state.'" 5 In levying a thirty
percent tax on Westmoreland's mining of Crow coal, the state had
appropriated the maximum possible economic rents from Crow
coal production. 36 The appeals court concluded that such a calculated state appropriation of available economic rents must inevitably preclude the Crow Tribe from maximizing economic benefit
from its mineral leases.1'3 The appeals court therefore held that
imposition of Montana's taxes on Crow coal frustrated the intent
of the 1938 Mineral Leasing Act, namely to maximize tribal revenues from mineral leases. 3 8
As long as the state appropriated thirty percent of the coal's
economic rents, 3 9 the appellate court reasoned, the Crow Tribe
had no economic room to negotiate higher royalties nor impose its
129. Id.
130. Id. at 592.
131. Crow 1I, 819 F.2d at 898.
132. Id. at 899.
133. Id. at 901.
134. Crow H, 819 F.2d at 902 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-35-101(1)(e) (1985)).
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Crow I defined economic rents as "the amount of
revenue that can be extracted from an activity, here in the form of royalties and taxes,
without significantly discouraging production." Crow I, 650 F.2d at 1113 n.12.
135. Crow H, 819 F.2d at 902.
136. Id. (quoting Crow I, 650 F.2d at 1113); see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-35-101(e)
(1985).
137. Crow II, 819 F.2d at 899, 902-03.
138. Id. at 898, 900, 903.
139. Id. at 902 (quoting Crow I,650 F.2d at 1113).
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own severance tax on its coal.1" 0 Were the Crow to raise the cost of
coal by raising its price or by adding its own tax to production, the
Tribe could no longer compete with either Montana or Wyoming
coal mines.14 Indeed, the appeals court found that the state taxes
had already depressed and "interfered" with Crow coal marketability. 4" Relying on an economic study cited by the Tribe, 4 ' the appeals court found that Montana's coal taxes had caused a shift in
coal market demand from Montana to Wyoming, resulting in a
4
twenty-two percent decline in Montana coal production."
Since
enactment of the taxes, Crow coal production had fallen from over
seven percent of the state's total to less than three percent. 4 5 Subsequent to Montana taxation, Wyoming coal production had risen
over twenty-five percent, and the Crow Tribe could not effectively
compete. 46 Based on these findings, the appeals court concluded
that Montana's coal taxes had impinged on the Crow Tribe's eco47
nomic interests.
As the Supreme Court asserted in Colville, a tribe's mere economic interest will not trigger federal preemption of a state tax. 4 s
The appeals court distinguished Crow Tribe from Colville, however, by deciding that the Crow Tribe's economic interest in its
coal was strong. 4 9 First-unlike the Colville Tribes, but like the
Cabazon Band-the Crow Tribe generated revenue from its own
reservation resources. 5 ' Second, the federal policy as found in the
Indian Mineral Leasing Act of maximizing Indian revenues from
mineral leases bolstered the Crow's asserted economic interest.' 5 '
These two factors combined to form the strong tribal interest
which the appeals court then balanced against the state's interest
140. Crow II, 819 F.2d at 902. "By setting the severance tax rate at 30 percent of
value, Montana made plain its intention to appropriate most of the [coal's] economic rent."
Id. (quoting Crow I, 650 F.2d at 1113).
141. Id. at 899-900.
142. Id. at 900. The appeals court explained:
As long as the taxes "interfere[] or [are] incompatible with federal and tribal interests reflected in federal law," they are deemed preempted "unless the state interests at stake are sufficient to justify the assertion of state authority." Any finding of interference, then, would be enough to subject the state taxes to
preemption. This record shows interference.
Id. (citations omitted).
143. Id. (citing "the NERA Report").
144. Id. at 899.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Colvile, 447 U.S. at 154-55.
149. Crow H, 819 F.2d at 899.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 898-99.
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in imposing its coal taxes."'
D.

Montana's Legitimate Interests

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that Montana
has some legitimate state interest in taxing Crow coal.' 53 However,
the court of appeals also made clear that the state's interest would
not overcome the Tribe's own interest in economic revitalization
5
without a more narrowly tailored tax scheme.' '
In analyzing what constitutes a legitimate interest, the appeals
court examined the impact of the Westmoreland mining operation
on the ceded strip and identified two clear state interests.'5 5 First,
the mining operation created an increased demand for state government services because of the influx of employees and service
companies required by the mining activity.'15 Second, the court of
appeals noted that the mining operation created increased costs to
state government because of the pollution and solid waste disposal
problems consequent to mining operations.' 5 7 The appeals court
rejected, however, the district court's finding that these increased
state government costs necessitated imposition of the state coal
taxes. 158 Citing the Crow-commissioned study as "hard evidence"
of Westmoreland's mining impact on government and the ceded
strip,'1 59 the appeals court found that though coal mining on the
strip had increased government costs by $38 million from 1972 to
1982, state, local and excise taxes "other than the coal taxes, provided state and local government with $42 million."' 6 0 The state
did not require coal taxes, then, to meet the increased costs generated by the Crow coal leases.
The district court had justified imposition of the coal taxes
not only on the present costs of coal mining to the state, but also
on the future costs.' 61 The district court explained that the legisla152. Id. at 898, 900.
153. Id. at 901. The court noted, however, that, "'It is unnecessary to rebalance [the
state, federal, and tribal] ... interests in every case.' The Supreme Court has increased the
presumption against finding legitimate state interests. Hence, even if we agree . . . that
Montana taxes support legitimate interests . . . [they] may no longer be sufficient." Id.
(quoting Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 215 n.17).
154. Id. at 903.
155. Id. at 900.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 901.
159. Id. Because the court of appeals reviewed the case de novo, the court was able to
consider substantial evidence not utilized by the court below.
160. Id.
161. Crow H, 657 F. Supp. at 581-83.
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ture's purpose in enacting the tax was to anticipate and provide for
162
future and unknown costs resulting from the resource extraction.
The appeals court, however, said that such future costs were too
speculative a foundation on which to base a tax of Crow coal. 163
The appeals court also noted that the bonding and reclamation
fees required by the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act
of 19776 already provided for some of the state's concerns about
pollution control and unknown future costs."6 5
Finally, while the district court had found that Montana had
"narrowly tailored" its tax to its legitimate interests,6 6 the appeals
court vigorously disagreed. 6 7 The appeals court noted that the legislature earmarked fifty percent of the coal severance tax for the
Coal Tax Trust Fund. 16 8 Montana has not dedicated that fund to
either reclamation or coal-related services. 16 9 Indeed, of the total
tax collected, only about nine percent went to coal-related expenses in 1981, as opposed to the thirty-one percent dedicated to
those expenses when the legislature first enacted the tax.' The
court of appeals found, then, that the state coal severance tax was
at best distantly related to coal-related services, and was not "narrowly tailored" to a legitimate state interest.17 ' Under this "narrowly tailored" standard, first indicated in Colville,'17 the state's
162. Id. at 584.
163. Crow II, 819 F.2d at 901.
164. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1982).
165. Crow II, 819 F.2d at 901.
166. Crow H, 657 F. Supp. at 592-93.
167. Crow H, 819 F.2d at 901.
168. Id. (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-35-108(1) (1985)).
169. Crow II, 819 F.2d at 901.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 901-02.
172. Colville, 447 U.S. at 163. The development of this standard from the "tailored"
language first enunciated in Colville to the "narrowly tailored to legitimate state interests"
standard of Crow II is remarkable. Colville is often cited for its chilling effect on tribal
revenue generation. See Fredericks, supra note 105. The "narrowly tailored" standard that
has grown from Colville, however, suggests that at least where non-tribal activities overlap
the geographic boundaries of a reservation and yet are generated from on-reservation tribal
resources, the presumption against state taxation is almost total. Compare this standard
with the much looser "fairly related" standards applied to the imposition of Montana's coal
severance tax on coal producers announced in Commonwealth Edison Co. U. Montana, 453
U.S. 609, 614-17 (1981). See supra note 99.
The Supreme Court has recently heard oral argument in Cotton Petroleum v. New
Mexico, 106 N.M. 511, 745 P.2d 1159 (N.M. 1987); 106 N.M. 517, 745 P.2d 1170 (N.M.App.
1987); prob. juris. noted, 108 S.Ct. 1466 (1988), a case that shares striking similarities to the
Crow case. In Cotton Petroleum, the New Mexico Supreme Court upheld a state severance
tax imposed on on-reservation non-Indian oil producers. The Jicarilla Apache Tribe leased
on-reservation oil and gas rights under the 1938 IMLA to Cotton Petroleum. New Mexico
levied its oil and gas severance tax on Cotton Petroleum, much as Montana levied its coal
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interest in taxing Crow coal did not outweigh the Tribe's interest
173
in economic development based on coal revenue.
The court of appeals noted in conclusion that the Supreme
Court's 1987 Cabazon ruling "increased the presumption against
finding legitimate state interests.' 1 74 The appellate court thus rejected the imposition of Montana's taxes on Crow-ceded strip coal
because of the federal policy to maximize tribal revenues and because the state had failed to establish that it tailored its taxes nar75
rowly to meet the state's legitimate interests.1

severance tax on Westmoreland Resources.
Unlike Crow, however, the Jicarilla Apache Tribe did not bring suit to attack the validity of the taxes. Rather, Cotton Petroleum, which is also subject to a tribal severance tax,
brought suit against the state on the basis that the state's tax was both a burden on interstate commerce, as in Commonwealth Edison, and that in the absence of an ability to apply
the Complete Auto Transit test utilized in Commonwealth Edison, the court should properly consider the value of the services the state provides Cotton Petroleum on the reservation in contrast to the amount of taxes that Cotton Petroleum pays the state. Cotton Petroleum claimed that New Mexico's taxes were not "fairly related" to the services the state
provided the taxpayer. This argument failed utterly in Commonwealth Edison, and the New
Mexico court properly rejected it. However, the court did consider the state's argument,
based on preemption principles elucidated in Bracker and Ramah, compelling. The court
found, much as the Crow district court did, that New Mexico's tax incidence fell, not on the
Tribe, but on Cotton Petroleum. The court also held that the tax did not significantly impact the Tribe.
The argument that Montana attempted to put forth in Crow I echoes, in part, Cotton
Petroleum's "fairly related" argument, and, in part, New Mexico's argument that the Tribe
was not burdened by the tax imposed. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals expressly refused
to apply either the Commonwealth Edison tests or a pure economic impact analysis in
Crow. See supra note 99.
Clearly, had the Tribe itself brought suit in Cotton Petroleum, the results in the lower
court might have been much different. The only proper result of the case should be to follow
the precedent developed in Crow, and to insist that New Mexico narrowly tailor its tax to
meet its legitimate interests. The economic impact analysis of Colville is best left behind as
an anomaly in the case law. Just as the Supreme Court noted in Commonwealth Edison, to
base a state tax's constitutionality on its economic impact would be to invite challenge after
challenge to the tax's validity as economic climates change. It should be just as obvious that
the validity of a state tax imposed on on-reservation economic activity cannot be measured
by its economic impact on a tribe, both because courts are ill-equipped to perform such an
analysis, and because tribal economies are just as volatile, if not more so, than are the
states'. The Crow Tribe made a convincing argument that any state taxation of on-reservation activities would not only impact the Tribe's ability to govern itself, it would also frustrate the firm federal policy of tribal economic self-determination.
The Commonwealth Edison criteria have no place in issues surrounding federal-tribal
preemption. If the Supreme Court upholds New Mexico's tax on Cotton Petroleum's onreservation leaseholds, it will mark a dangerous departure from traditional principles of Indian sovereignty and will mark a new era of state intrusion into the reservation.
173. Crow 11, 819 F.2d at 902-03.
174. Id. at 901.
175. Id. at 903.
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Tribal Self-Government as an Independent
Barrier to Taxation

Principles of tribal sovereignty have informed U.S. Supreme
Court decisions in Indian affairs since Worcester v. Georgia in
1832.170 In the past decade, the Supreme Court has modified those
principles, departing from the rigid geographic and sovereign political boundaries described by Justice Marshall in Worcester. In
Worcester Justice Marshall had declared that "[t]he Cherokee Nation ... is a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with
boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can
have no force."' 7 In Colville, the Supreme Court imposed a balancing test to determine whether state taxation impermissibly infringed on tribal self-government. 178 This balancing test must be
"assessed against ... traditional notions of Indian sovereignty."' 17 9
The Crow district court had held that Montana's tax did not
impinge on tribal self-government.'" ° The court reached this holding because it had concluded that the ceded strip was not part of
the reservation, and that, therefore, the Crow Tribe could not exercise any attributes of self-government over its "ceded" coal.18 1 The
court of appeals reversed, however, implying that "because the
minerals underlying the ceded area are owned by the Tribe and are
considered part of the Crow Reservation,' 18 the Tribe can exercise
not only proprietary rights, but also sovereign powers of government over those minerals. 8 ' The most notable sovereign power the
Crow Tribe sought to exercise was that of imposing its own tribal
severance tax on the ceded strip coal."8 The appeals court found
176. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). See also McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823),
and Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 48 (1831), for the seminal cases on tribal
sovereignty.
177. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561.
178. Colville, 447 U.S. at 161.
179. Crow 11, 819 F.2d at 902 (quoting Mescalero, 462 U.S. at 334).
180. Crow 11, 657 F. Supp. at 593.
181. Id.
182. Crow 11, 819 F.2d at 902 (citing Crow I, 650 F.2d at 1117, where the court of
appeals had held that the minerals underlying the ceded strip are "a component of the
reservation").
183. Crow H, 819 F.2d at 902.
184. See CROW TRIB. COAL TAXATION CODE tit. I § 4 (1982) which states:
Coal Mining Tax.
(a) A person engaged in or carrying on the business of coal mining, or engaged in
the business of working or operating a coal mine or coal mining property from
which marketable or merchantable coal of any kind is severed or produced by
means of strip coal mining, or underground mining, whether the person carries on
the operations as owner, lessee, trustee, possessor, receiver or in any other capacity, must for the year this code becomes effective and each year thereafter, pay to
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that Montana's tax prevented the Crow Tribe from reaping the full
economic benefit from its coal, including tribal tax revenues.18 5 Not
only did state taxes impermissibly contravene the federal policy of
maximizing tribal economic benefit, but they also impinged impermissibly on the Crow Tribe's ability to self-govern.' 8 6 The sovereign power to tax coal mining and the tribal government functions
87
supported by such taxes are intrinsic to Crow self-government.1
The imperative for tribal self-government operates as an "independent barrier to state regulation,"'8 8 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted. The appellate court therefore held that even were
Montana's taxes narrowly tailored to legitimate state interests, the
state taxes on Crow coal would be "invalid because [they] erode
the Tribe's sovereign authority."'8 9
As a necessary corollary of its holding that Montana could not
tax ceded strip coal, the court of appeals also held that the state
could not tax future coal mining within Crow Reservation
boundaries.' 90

IV.

ANALYSIS

Montana has defended its imposition of coal taxes on Crow
tribal coal during an era of state economic decline.' 91 Undoubtedly
the state coveted the $20 million Westmoreland deposited in the
district court escrow account as state revenues declined and the
legislature steeled itself to slash state budgets. Unfortunately,
while Montana fought a losing battle to secure the Crow Tribe's
share of coal taxes, the state may have imperilled its continued
ability to impose coal taxes on all other Montana coal resources.
The Crow cases were not the first assault on the validity of Montana coal taxes, and they will not be the last.
the Treasury for the use and benefit of the Crow Tribe of Indians, a tax for engaging in and carrying on the operations described above. Said tax shall be assessed
in accordance with Section Six (6) below.
(b) Said tax will be imposed on each ton of marketable or merchantable coal beneficially owned by the Crow Tribe wherever located and all coal severed within the
boundaries of the Crow Indian Reservation which is severed or produced by
means of strip coal mining or underground mining by an operator.

Id.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
(1981).

Crow H, 819 F.2d at 900.
Id. at 902-03.
Id. at 902.
Id. (citing Bracker, 448 U.S. at 142-43).
Crow H, 819 F.2d at 903.
Id. at 903.
Commonwealth Edison, 189 Mont. 191, 615 P.2d 847 (1980), aff'd, 453 U.S. 609
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In 1981, coal companies challenged Montana's coal taxes in
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana.19 2 In that case the Supreme Court upheld Montana's coal taxes as nondiscriminatory
and fairly related to state interests.19 3 The Commonwealth Edison
Court observed, however, that Montana's coal taxes remained valid
only in the absence of federal legislation preempting them. 9 4 After
Commonwealth Edison, then, Montana was put on notice of at
least one ground on which its coal taxes were vulnerable to attack.
Responding to the state's failure to demonstrate sufficient state interest in its taxes, Congress, exercising its plenary commerce powers, could instantly invalidate the taxes.
In striking down Montana's taxes on Crow coal, the court of
appeals found Montana's interest uncompelling. Other taxes and
fees, the Crow court found, already protected Montana against
present and future impacts of coal mining. 19 5 The court did not
examine, however, a primary legislative intent in establishing the
coal severance tax and the Coal Tax Trust Fund. The legislature
intended the Trust Fund as a legacy to the future when Montana's
coal resources are mined out and Montanans must find an alternative to resource extraction as an economic base.' The coal taxes,
therefore, meet not only the direct effects of coal mining, but also
provide a fund for the indirect effects Montanans will face when
natural resource extraction can no longer sustain an important seg97
ment of Montana's economy.1
192. 453 U.S. 609 (1981).
193. Id. at 614, 620, 629.
194. 453 U.S. at 608 (White, J., concurring). Justice White said, "The constitutional
authority and the machinery to thwart efforts such as those of Montana, if thought unacceptable, are available to Congress, and surely Montana and other similarly situated states
do not have the political power to impose their will on the rest of the country." Id. The
Crow and the state of Montana are thus in a strikingly similar position, each subject to
immediate Congressional action, and neither possessing the clout to defend against such
action.
195, Crow H, 819 F.2d at 901.
196. Crow H, 657 F. Supp. at 585. See MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 5; see also Commonwealth Edison v. Montana, 189 Mont. 191, 196, 615 P.2d 847, 850 (1980).
197. Montana Supreme Court Justice John Sheehy, writing for the court in Commonwealth Edison, 189 Mont. 191, 615 P.2d 847 (1980), explained the history of Montana's Coal
Severance Tax and Trust Fund in light of the state's experience:
Montana's experience had shown that its mineral wealth could be exhausted and
exported with little left in Montana to make up the loss of its irreplaceable resources. Montana has been painfully educated about the extreme economic jolts
that follow when the mine runs out, the oil depletes, or the timber saws come still.
We have a good many examples that teach us what happens to our hills when the
riches of our Treasure State are spent. For these and other reasons, when strip
coal mining was beginning to burgeon, in 1975, the legislature moved to fix a tax
that would provide both for the present and the future when the coal deposits
were gone.
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The Crow Tribe, of course, also shares this concern for the future when its mineral resources are wholly depleted.1 98 By imposing its own severance taxes, the Tribe has created an opportunity
to build a future economic base to replace its eventual loss of coal
reserves. 19 9 In litigating against the Tribe, the state failed to see
that supporting a tribal severance tax and tribal economic developId. at 196, 615 P.2d at 850.
198. The Crow Tribe has shown a consistent concern, not only for the effects of coal
mining on the reservation environment, but for the effect that coal mining might have on
the Crow society as well. A 1973 report to the Crow Tribe detailed the effects of coal mining
on the reservation and foreshadowed Justice Sheehy's remarks about Montana's future after
coal depletion in Commonwealth Edison, supra note 197. The report said, referring to coal
development and depletion on the Crow Reservation:
These are only some of the social issues that will have to be dealt with if large
scale coal development comes to the Crow Reservation. There are many others.
For one thing, plant construction will cause a rapid growth in population, but one
that will only last for the construction period. Yet the construction workers and
their families will have to be accommodated. There will have to be adequate
school facilities ... housing will have to be provided, health care, retail stores and
so on. However, once the construction is completed the population will drop somewhat leaving the community to deal with what is left. Most likely what will be left
will include: new classrooms now empty, too many teachers and more school supplies than are needed; empty houses; new businesses with not enough business;
more public services than can be supported; and, for many of those who worked
on the construction and are unwilling or unable to relocate, there is
unemployment.
In the long run there is one other social impact associated with coal development. After the coal is expended, after the plants are worn out or have been shut
down for whatever reason, there is an adjustment to living in a community noe
[sic] dying, a community whose economic base has collasped [sic], a community
now forced to look for some new reason to exist. If new business is found, the
community goes on. If not, the community becomes, for all practical purposes,
another product of exploitation, a boom and bust phenomenon, just one more
Western ghost town.
J. Schwechten, Coal Mining and Coal Utilization on the Crow Indian Reservation and Adjacent Ceded Strip, A Preliminary Social Impact Report 4 (Oct. 1973) (unpublished report of
the Crow Tribe Community Action Program presented to the Crow Tribe, Oct., 1973; available at the University of Montana Mansfield Library, Missoula, Montana).
199. Reflecting that concern, the Crow Tribal Coal Taxation Code states:
Since the mining of Crow coal resources represents the perpetual loss of a nonrenewable and valuable tribal asset, the Tribe will be indemnified for the extraction
of those resources. The receipt of revenue from this tax will allow the Tribe to
upgrade and improve governmental services, especially the increase in those services needed to insure against damage to the total social, cultural, economic and
environmental well-being of the Crow Tribe that may occur as a result of the extraction of coal.
Finally, the imposition of a tax on coal resources will discourage resource
waste and thus insure that adequate amounts of mineral resources will be available for future generations of the Crow Tribe. In addition, the revenue of said tax
will enable the Tribe to establish, manage and control programs designed to offset
the effect of mining of Crow coal.
CROW TRIB. COAL TAXATION CODE tit. I § 2 (1982).
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ment must benefit all Montanans.2 0 0 The economic vitality of the
Crow Tribe contributes significantly to the economic vitality of the
whole state. It must not be forgotten that the Crow are Montana
citizens.2 0'
Furthermore, by litigating against the Tribe, the state secured
a ruling, affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court,20 2 that its interest in
providing an alternative economic base for the future is only distantly related to the taxes it imposes.20 3 This ruling weakens both
the state's and the Tribe's argument for funding a legacy trust
from coal taxation. Had the state recognized the Tribe's sovereign
interest in taxing coal, it would have strengthened its own sovereign justification for its coal taxes. Instead, the state argued the
inherently inconsistent position that for its own sovereign interests
the state could tax another sovereign's resources.
The Crow case, however, is just another example of the state's
general inconsistency in coal taxation policy. In district court, the
state argued the necessity of funding a trust fund for the future,20 '
yet a few short years later countenanced legislative raids on the
Coal Tax Trust Fund for current state budgetary needs.2 0 5 The
state argued on appeal that its coal taxes do not adversely affect
coal marketability; 200 yet a few short years later the legislature reduced coal tax rates on the grounds that coal taxes do adversely
affect coal marketability. 20 7 If Montana is to defend its coal taxes
against the inevitable future assaults by coal companies, the state
must elucidate a consistent and thus credible coal taxation policy.
200. Note that former Montana State Senator Thomas E. Towe, a leading proponent
of the Coal Severance Tax and Trust Fund, had the foresight to introduce in the 1977 Legislative Session S.B. 319, "An Act allowing a credit against the Coal Severance Tax for any
similar tax levied by an Indian tribe on coal produced on a reservation." S.B. 319, 45th Leg.
(1977). The bill failed to pass. See J. Bulger, Walking on the Edge of the Pit: A Look at the
History of Montana's Coal Severance Tax (Spring 1988) (unpublished paper available at the
University of Montana School of Law, Missoula, Montana).
201. Congress conferred citizenship on some Indians through the terms of the allotment acts, and several special acts, and on all Indians in 1924. Citizenship Act of 1924, 43
Stat. 253, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1401 a(2) (1924). State citizenship attaches through the 14th amendment to the United States Constitution, U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV, § 1, which states, "All
persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the . . . state wherein they reside." Id.
202. Crow I, 108 S. Ct. 202 (1988).
203. Crow II, 819 F.2d at 901.
204. Crow II, 657 F. Supp. at 584.
205. See Bulger, supra note 199.
206. Crow II, 819 F.2d at 899-900.
207. See New Coal Production Incentive Tax Credit Act, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 15-35201 to -205 (1987). See also Bulger, supra note 199, at 10-12.
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CONCLUSION

Montana and the Crow Tribe not only have shared interests in
justifying their coal taxes, they also have shared adversaries. Montana's coal taxes, as the Commonwealth Edison Court noted, are
subject to congressional tolerance."0 8 At any time it chooses under
its constitutional commerce powers,209 Congress may preempt
Montana's coal taxes. So too, the Crow Tribe's taxing authority, its
reserved lands, indeed its very status as a Tribe are subject to congressional tolerance. Montanans have noted and disclaimed that
power over the tribes. Montanans chose, in drafting the 1972 Constitution, to reaffirm the "absolute jurisdiction and control" of the
United States Congress over the Indian tribes of Montana. 210 At

any time it chooses, under its constitutional power to regulate Indian affairs, Congress may preempt tribal taxing authority and,
some would argue, even abolish the reservation and the special fed" ' Montana and the Crow Tribe therefore
eral-tribal relationship.21
have in common the necessity of promoting the case for sovereign
self-government. In drafting the 1972 Constitution, Montanans reaffirmed their commitment to self-government and self-determination, free of domination by outside interests more powerful than
this state.21 2 In its struggle to assert taxing authority over its coal,

the Crow Tribe has demonstrated the same commitment to selfgovernment and self-determination. If Montana is to defend itself
successfully against further federal government domination of its
natural resources, and if Montana genuinely wishes to guard the
future for its children, the state should cultivate the Crow Tribe as
a new yet natural ally in this struggle.

208.

Commonwealth Edison, 453 U.S. at 608 (White, J., concurring).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
210. MONT. CONST. art. I (1972).
211. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
212. See MONT. CONST. art. II, § 2, which states: "The people have the exclusive right
of governing themselves as a free, sovereign, and independent state."

209.
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